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What do I have to do to get promoted? Tory MPs resent the
reduced likelihood of reshuffles and promotions under
coalition
Timothy Heppell explores the Prime Minister ’s power to appoint or dismiss
parliamentarians from cabinet and suggests that while some backbenchers may be irritated
by Cameron’s perceived restraint, a reshuffle could permit the Liberal Democrats to
renegotiate and improve their portfolio distribution.
The power to appoint and dismiss is one of  the most important powers at the disposal
of  the prime minister. It is through their powers of  patronage that they shape, and
reshape through reshuf f les, their government. It is this power that gives them polit ical
leverage and ensures their dominance over their polit ical colleagues. However, there is increasing
f rustration amongst Conservative MPs, especially the new entrants in 2010, about how David Cameron is
using, or rather, not using this power. His f ailure to advance them is creating resentment. Louise Mensch
encapsulated the problem with Cameron’s reluctance to reshuf f le his ministers when she said: ‘what do I
have to do to get promoted?’
What are the criteria through which prime ministers decide that some parliamentarians should be
ministers and some should not? A good starting point is identif ying whether they have the qualit ies
required f or ministerial of f ice: are they administratively competent? Can they def end their department in
the heat of  parliamentary debate? Can they justif y their policy choices to the electorate through the
media?
These qualif ications immediately will discount some backbenches within the governing party, with others
discounted due to inappropriateness – e.g. personal behaviour, polit ical att itudes, rebelliousness and
disloyalty. From within those who are deemed to be qualif ied, prime ministers also need to consider
certain balances – e.g. regional, gender, age and experience.
The power of  patronage is also a key weapon in terms of  internal party management and good
government. On the latter issue weak, inef f ectual and tired ministers need to be removed, to allow
regular inf usions of  new talent to the ministerial ranks. The prospect of  loyalty being rewarded with
ministerial of f ice is crit ical. Historically, it is one of  the weapons through which the Whips’ Of f ice has
sought to retain cohesion within the division lobbies – i.e. rebels don’t of ten get ministerial of f ice.
The dynamics of  coalit ion alter these tradit ional models f or explaining ministerial pref erment within
Brit ish government. Cameron has limited his prime ministerial prerogative to make ministerial
appointments. Nick Clegg has to be f ully consulted on ministerial removals or portf olio re-distributions if
a wider ministerial reshuf f le is required. The coalit ion agreement also ensures that Clegg has the right to
secure joint agreement with the prime minister regarding the allocation of  portf olios between the parties.
The lessons f rom coalit ion government elsewhere is that the increased risks associated with dual party
ministerial reshuf f les means that they occur less of ten than in single party administrations.
For Conservative parliamentarians there are clearly negative impacts in terms of  their own career
progression. A signif icant proportion of  ambitious Conservative MPs f ear that they may f all into the
category of  parliamentarian that John Major f amously dismissed as the never possessed. Cameron has
disappointed the f ollowing distinct groups within his own parliamentarians but his reluctance to reshuf f le:
First, those who did receive ministerial pref erment in May 2010, but at a level lower than they had
expected – expectant cabinet ministers f ound themselves at Minister of  State level, and expectant
Minister of  States are now Parliamentary Under Secretaries of  State.
Second, those who were expecting ministerial of f ice in May 2010, but instead f ound that the red
boxes that they dreamed of  holding were being opened by Liberal Democrats.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, coalit ion is stalling the assumed meteoric career rises of
the new entrants of  2010. Many of  them will have noted with interest the rapid promotions of f ered
to the likes of  David and Ed Miliband or Ed Balls in the New Labour era, all of  whom were ministers
within a year of  entering Parliament. As such new Conservatives would have hoped that pref erment
would have come their way by 2012.
It is the impact of  the second and third categories that has caused Cameron party management
problems. Both longer serving and new entrants f eel that their f uture ambitions are being limited by
coalit ion and the lack of  a substantive reshuf f le since entering power. This f rustration is manif esting
itself  in increased parliamentary rebellion. The rebellion rate in the f irst eighteen months of  the coalit ion
represents the highest rate in the post-war period (43 percent of  all divisions involving dissent by
coalit ion backbenchers). Of  these the rebellion rate is 31 percent amongst Conservative backbenchers,
and 21 percent amongst Liberal Democrats. The coalit ion rate, and the Conservative rate, is larger than
the previous post war high of  28 percent. Cameron’s reluctance to engage in a substantive reshuf f le will
be a contributory f actor to the increased rebellion rates.
However, it could be that Cameron does not reshuf f le because he is relatively content with the number
of  Liberal Democrat ministers and where they are located. Nick Clegg is understaf f ed in the Of f ice of
Deputy prime minister; Michael Moore is marginalised in the Scottish Of f ice (which the Liberal Democrats
had previously advocated abolishing); and Danny Alexander has shared responsibility f or the cuts
agenda that the coalit ion have f elt compelled to implement. By placing Chris Huhne (and latterly Ed
Davey) in Energy and Climate Change and Vince Cable at Business, Innovation and Skills, leading Liberal
Democrats were lef t to advance causes (the building of  new nuclear power stations and increased tuit ion
f ees) that made a mockery of  the promises they made in the General Election campaign.
The experience of  coalit ions abroad tells us that the party who lead the department have ownership of
that policy agenda. This can be tied into electioneering, allowing smaller parties to claim ownership of
specif ic policies within the coalit ion. The portf olio allocation that was init ially agreed by Cameron ensured
that the Liberal Democrats would have litt le substantive policy achievements to their name. It may irritate
Cameron’s ambitious backbenchers but a reshuf f le would permit the Liberal Democrats to renegotiate on
portf olio distribution, and thus limiting reshuf f les may be something Conservatives should be relatively
comf ortable with.
This is the second in a series of posts by contributors to the recent ‘Conservatives in Coalit ion
Government’ conference organised by the Polit ical Studies Association Specialist Group for the
study of Conservatives and Conservatism and the Centre for Brit ish Polit ics at the University of
Hull. The views expressed are those of the author alone and not those of the Polit ical Studies
Association or the University of Hull.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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